In this paper the pricing scheme of the Hungarian electricity balancing market and its incentive effect on the schedule-following will be discussed.
The fundamental aim of the research is to evaluate how the parameters of the pricing system motivate the balance responsible parties (BRPs) to provide an exact schedule. The transmission system operator has modified the parameters in 2013 in order to encourage BRPs in producing more precise schedules than before. The effects of these modifications will be analyzed in the paper.
The daily routine of the domestic power markets, the system of balance-groups, the aim of day-ahead schedule, the definition of balancing energy will be presented based on the Code of Commerce. The pricing scheme of balancing energy will be detailed theoretically and in practice. Based on a model, the strategy of market participants is examined when they over-, and under-schedule their next-day market positions. Using historical data and the model, the effect of the recent change in the margin factors is shown. Furthermore, the correlation between the wind power production and the system’s state is examined.
The conclusion of the research will show that both the former and the current pricing scheme of the Hungarian electricity balancing market encourage BRPs to overschedule their day-ahead energy market position. The altered factors did not result in significant changes in the incentive effect; the relations between market prices have greater impact on this.