Spectrum auctions has been used for distributing frequency bands those are used in mobile communication for decades. Certain type of auctions has been used for selling or hiring out products or rights for centuries. The auctions of spectrum licenses and the participants both have great influence on the evolution of these auction forms. The national authorities who are selling the licenses and the providers who are buying the licenses. Game theory has a seperate specialty for such auctions.
Many different type of auctions exist and many of them were used on recent spectrum auctions. Spectrum auctions made several billions of euros revenue for sellers, that is why developing auction forms is in the interest of sellers for maximizing revenues. Providers, who buy the licenses are interested in developing the auction strategies for obtaining frequency bands for as low prices as possible. The outcome of auction is greatly influenced by careful designing of the auction’s process. The purpose of accurate designing is to restrict the circle of strategies that participants can use and to swing the outcome of auction to the expected result. Each paramters: the expenses of providers, the incomes of authorities, the distributable frequency bands, the strategy of bidders, all of them depends on the quality of auction design. The first step of my work is going to be to analyze the 3g and 4g auctions from the near past. The outcome of auctions, the applied strategies and the contingent commited mistakes in the auction design.
Then I am going to run simulations with the latest combinatorial algorithm and analyze the solutions of these simulations as well. In addition I am willing to predict the auction for 4g frequency bands in the United Kingdom that is going to be hold in the near future.